Produced by the
National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems
(Updated:October 2002)
Copyright 2004 National Association of
Protection and Advocacy Systems All rights reserved.
*N.B.: Non-published court decisions and decisions of
the United States Department of Education, Office of
Civil Rights are not included herein. They may be
found in the National Disability Law Reporter.
Used with permission
(Thanks to Cheryl Bates-Harris)
SUMMARY OF CASES
This section of the manual provides brief summaries of the key legal cases involving State VR Agencies. Following these summaries, which are provided in alphabetical order, an index of subject titles is provided and the cases applicable to each subject area are listed. At the end of this section, copies of the cases are provided.
Facts: Cooper used a wheelchair after an auto accident. He was insured by Aetna. Aetna filed the action seeking declaratory judgment to adjudicate the obligations of VR, especially to determine the amount it may recover as restitution under Pennsylvania law. Aetna argues that it has an action in restitution for certain transportation costs provided to Cooper at Aetna’s expense, and that VR was obligated to pay these costs under the Rehabilitation Act.
Held: The district court held that Aetna had no standing to sue under the Rehabilitation Act, noting that "[t]here is no federal right of action, expressed or implied, under the Rehabilitation Act for an insurer to adjudicate a claim for restitution.... Only handicapped individuals have a cause of action under the Rehabilitation Act." Aetna’s claim was dismissed without prejudice.
Facts: Barbee has a severe learning disability. Because she felt that her prior training for a position as a cafeteria cashier was not properly matched to her cognitive abilities, she applied for VR sponsorship of a vocational plan to prepare her for a career in child care or care for the elderly. She expressed her preference for a program at the Para-Educator Center for Young Adults at New York University ("PEC"). VR denied her request for sponsorship of the PEC program, but recommended 3 other programs. Barbee appealed VR’s determination, and, in the meantime, enrolled in PEC. VR’s decision was reversed in a fair hearing, but the VR Commissioner annulled the hearing officer’s decision. Barbee filed suit in New York State Supreme Court which transferred the matter to the New York State Appellate Division, 3rd Department.
Held: The Appellate Court held that there was substantial evidence to support VR’s reversal of the hearing officer’s decision. The Court stated that VR was not required to sponsor petitioner at PEC because: Barbee enrolled in the program before an IWRP was developed, without giving adequate consideration to alternative programs that had been recommended to her and after she had been advised that VR was not willing to sponsor her in that program. The court noted that the hearing officer committed clear error by basing his decision on the patently erroneous assumption that VR had originally agreed to sponsor her enrollment.
Facts: Appealing a termination of VR services, the client argued that the agency's determination, was "arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion."
Held: The court held that the agency was required to consult with the recipient of services before terminating services; but failure to do so did not invalidate termination because the claimant was entitled to a post-termination hearing. The court found that there had been no retaliation in the termination of services. It upheld the termination under the prior federal "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard where strong history of noncooperation and absenteeism on the part of the client was present.
Facts: Bell, who has chemical sensitivity, applied for vocational services. VR determined that Bell would have to undergo a vocational evaluation to measure her residual functioning capacity and her residual vocational capacity. Bell refused and VR advised her it was closing her case. A hearing officer found that VR was under no obligation to accept a consumer's choice of vocational goal without evaluation. The hearing officer found that VR correctly closed Bell's case due to her refusal to participate in the evaluation. Bell filed suit in state court, claiming that VR violated the Rehabilitation Act in failing to reasonably accommodate her.
Held: The state court held that, because substantial evidence supported VR’s finding that Bell, for reasons unrelated to her disability, refused to cooperate in a work evaluation, VR properly closed her case. The court affirmed VR's determination.
Summary: Student who is deaf graduated with a BA in psychology. His Individualized Written Rehabilitation Program (IWRP) only agreed to pay for his undergraduate degree. He was offered a position as a Divisional of Vocational Rehabilitation (DVR) counselor for the deaf, but he rejected that offer. Instead, he requested that DVR pay for his legal education. DVR declined this request. Deaf student brought suit against DVR, alleging that DVR had discriminated against him on the basis of his disability, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, by refusing to fund his legal education. The United States District Court ruled in favor of DVR. The student appealed this decision.
Held: The Court of Appeals held that the student failed to establish either disparate impact or disparate treatment claim stemming from DVR’s refusal to pay for his law school education.
Plaintiff argued that DVR’s refusal to pay for his legal education created a disparate impact on people with disabilities who wanted to go to law school by not funding law school. Disparate impact occurs when a facially neutral state action creates an obstacle between disabled persons and access to federally-funded programs that is greater than the obstacle for non-disabled persons. The court saw the plaintiff’s disparate impact claim as frivolous because the legal profession is not a federally funded program, and the refusal of DVR to fund his legal education did not constitute a greater obstacle than the obstacles encountered by those who want to go to law school and do not have a disability.
Plaintiff also argued that he was subjected to disparate treatment by DVR. To succeed on the claim, plaintiffs have to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that DVR intended to discriminate against him on the basis of his disability. The plaintiff argued that he was subjected to disparate treatment because DVR did not follow its own policies when it denied his requests. However, the plaintiff failed to show that the policies were applied inconsistently. Furthermore, DVR presented evidence that it had never funded anyone for graduate school. The court did not decide whether § 504 prohibits discrimination amongst its clients with disabilities with respect to distribution of benefits.
Summary: Plaintiff, a teacher with a master’s degree, sued the Wisconsin Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (DVR) for denying her financial assistance for law school. DVR rejected this request because the counselor developed a rehabilitation plan to get employment for plaintiff, since plaintiff already had a Master’s Degree. Plaintiff brought legal action against DVR under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act claiming that DVR discriminated against her because of her mental illness. Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages under section 1983. She also brought a §1983 claim against the individual state officials on the grounds that they violated her constitutional rights by refusing to pay for law school.
The magistrate judge gave summary judgment to defendant on the section 504 claim. The judge also dismissed plaintiff’s claims against the DVR and the individual defendants in their official capacities on sovereign immunity grounds, and dismissed her 1983 claims that the individual defendants violated her constitutional rights by denying her request for financial assistance to attend law school. The judge however let plaintiff proceed with her section 1983 claim that the individual defendants violated the Rehabilitation Act by implementing a policy that disfavors funding for graduate school. A jury later returned a verdict in favor of the individual defendants. Plaintiff appealed.
Held: The court of appeals ruled in favor of DVR. The court ruled that the plaintiff was not an otherwise qualified individual with a disability for Vocational Rehabilitation benefits because she is not able to meet all of the program requirements in spite of her disability. The court ruled that plaintiff cannot show that people without disabilities receive the same benefits that were denied to people with disabilities. Therefore, the DVR did not violate section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
The court of appeals also rejected plaintiff’s claim that the magistrate erred in allowing DVR to submit evidence showing that it encouraged clients to go to graduate school. The court concluded that this evidence refuted plaintiff’s claim that DVR discouraged people from going to law school.
Facts: Petitioner, an individual with quadriplegia qualified for VR services, filed an action in state court in Otsego County seeking a judgment annulling and reversing VR’s determination not to provide home modifications. VR moved for a change of venue to Albany County.
Held: The Otsego County Court held that New York’s Civil procedure rules place venue for commencement of actions brought against the Commissioner of the Department of Education, in which VR is headquartered, in Albany County. The court noted that "it is disingenuous to assert that the [VR Deputy Commissioner’s] duties are entirely separate from and beyond the purview of the Commissioner. The [VR] Deputy Commissioner is subordinate to the Commissioner [of Education], and acts on behalf of the Commissioner [of Education] in carrying out these duties."
Facts: Brooks, a consumer with Multiple Chemical Sensitivities (MCS), was denied reimbursement for chiropractic services by VR. A hearing officer affirmed, noting that Brooks had failed to provide any competent medical evidence that chiropractic services were necessary to reduce MCS. The VR commissioner affirmed. Brooks appealed to state court, alleging that VR violated the Rehabilitation Act by failing to reasonably accommodate her when it refused to reimburse expenses related to chiropractic treatment. Brooks also alleged a due process violation based on VR’s alleged failure to hold a timely hearing regarding the issue of reimbursement as well as other issues.
Held: The state court held for VR. First, the court rejected the claim relating to reimbursement for chiropractic-related expenses on the basis that the evidence did not show that chiropractic services could alleviate MCS and further the client’s vocational goals. The due process claim was rejected as well, since the delay in conducting the hearing was negotiated by and between all the parties.
Facts: Mr. Buchanan's and his counselor with the Maine Bureau of Rehabilitation developed an IWRP. The vocational goal was to be a self-employed commercial photographer. His plan included the services needed to reach that goal. A small business consultant evaluated Mr. Buchanan's self-employment proposal at the request of the Bureau. The recommendation was negative and the Bureau denied the request for services related to that goal. The denial was upheld on administrative review. Mr. Buchanan appealed to fair hearing and won. The Bureau director reversed the fair hearing decision, in part on the ground that "there were other vocational options consistent with [plaintiff's] capacities and abilities, which ... are achievable at much lower cost than providing the cost services necessary to start self employment as a photographer." Mr. Buchanan appealed to federal court.
Held: The director could not consider economic factors in determining a client's goals and needs, but could do so in implementing services designed to reach a client's maximum potential, provided costs were not the major determinant used to deny funding of services, since under the federal Rehabilitation Act regulations, the Bureau was required to provide services "appropriate to the vocational needs of each individual." The "maximize" language reflected Congress' intent "to establish a program which would provide services to assist clients in achieving their highest level of achievement or a goal which is consistent with their maximum capacities and abilities." The term "suitable" must be interpreted in light of "maximizing employability" so that if services do not maximize employability, they cannot be suitable. However, the identification of the vocational goal is a joint process with the counselor and Bureau having the final decision making authority. While the it was not the intent of Congress to place individuals in entry level positions, the Act does not require that in every case the client's optimum level be reached.
Facts: Petitioner, an individual with alcoholism, submitted an application to VR for services which was denied. VR's denial was upheld at fair hearing and by the VR commissioner. The hearing officer relied upon VR’s policy 202.00 which essentially re-states the eligibility criteria of 29 U.S.C. § 722(a)(1), viz., that an individual must a) have a disability and b) require VR services for employment. Petitioner then commenced an action in state court. The trial court annulled VR’s determination and declared that policy 202.00 is a "rule" subject to the State Administrative Procedure Act ("SAPA") and is invalid because VR did not promulgate the policy according to that statute’s rule-making procedures. VR appealed.
Held: The appellate court ruled that VR’s policy 202.00 is not a rule or regulation requiring filing under SAPA § 102(2)(a). The court noted that: ASignificantly, excepted from the formal rule-making procedures under the statute are forms and instructions, interpretive statements and general policy which in themselves have no legal effect but are merely explanatory' (State Administrative Procedure Act § 102 [b][iv])." The court recognized that this exception was applicable as it clearly restates the eligibility criteria set forth in the Rehabilitation Act and has no legal effect standing alone.
Facts: Petitioner is quadriplegic in mid-40's and has been employed by School district since 1972 first as a teacher and then for the last 7 2 years as a guidance counselor. Petitioner applied to VESID (Vocational and Educational Services for Individuals with Disabilities) for computer technology known as a "Dragon Dictate" system, which is a voice activated computer system, to facilitate his performance of work related writing at home. VESID denied eligibility on the grounds that Petitioner did not have a disability that constitutes a substantial impediment to employment, i.e. he had been able to maintain competitive employment in an integrated labor market. (Performance as guidance counselor was exemplary and he was tenured so in no danger of losing his job).
Held: Court rejected VESID's argument. VESID is not in the best position to determine the bounds of petitioner's potential and judge that the Petitioner's present position is all he should ever expect to achieve. Petitioner's current achievement was accomplished at great personal sacrifice. Furthermore, the Title I VR program is designed to "meet the broad range of needs of individuals [with disabilities] in becoming integrated into competitive workplace and community and reaching their highest level of achievement." [Cites Polkabla and Firth.]
Facts: Petitioner, who has spina bifida, sought vocational services from VR. VR referred him to Rusk Institute of Rehabilitative Medicine ("IRM") for evaluation which revealed that he had the ability to perform adequately in college but that he needed support services. Petitioner entered college but was unable to remain in the dormitory as he had difficulty in managing his personal hygiene and self-care. He then returned to IRM for special work and personal adjustment training. As a result of lack of improvement, IRM referred him to the Gatehouse Independent Living Rehabilitation and Training Program ("gatehouse") in Pennsylvania, an inpatient program focusing on individuals with spinal bifida. VR denied petitioner’s application for payment of his expenses at Gatehouse on the ground that there were comparable programs in New York. VR’s determination was affirmed at fair hearing. Petitioner brought suit in State Court. The trial court transferred the matter to the appellate court.
Held: After severing Petitioner’s damage claims, the appellate court held that when, as here, an agency determination is made following an evidentiary hearing, the determination must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. The record showed that VR was precluded from providing out-of-state training except where the client needs a special program or training which is not available in the state. VR established, through testimony, that this exception was not applicable in this case because there were equivalent programs in New York. The court found that VR’s determination was supported by substantial evidence and affirmed. The court noted that it would not review evidence which Petitioner submitted to VR’s Commissioner after the fair hearing as there is no basis in New York law for supplementing the record at fair hearing.
Facts: Petitioner is a 21 year old student at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln. She suffers from cerebral palsy and uses a wheelchair. She also requires "minimum" attendant care. She applied to University and filled out an on-campus housing form and requested a double room but did not specify a roommate. University policy dictates that in such cases, the student's name is placed into a roommate "pool." However, the University did not do this with the Petitioner's name because of another policy that does not assign roommates to wheelchair users students who require attendant care.
Held: Since the Petitioner was qualified under both the ADA and the Rehab Act to participate in the housing assignment program and additional requirements are not "essential" for the purposes of the ADA and the Rehab Act, the University's blanket policy violates both Acts. Further, participation in "special" programs must be by choice and cannot be used as a basis for exclusion from the general program. The Petitioner was qualified under the ADA and the Rehab Act because she met the requirements to participate in the program namely, that she was admitted to the University and that she completed and submitted a residence housing application. The University's assertion that the Petitioner failed to meet the other requirements is without merit, because, under the ADA and the Rehab Act, those requirements are not "essential" Namely, the use of more than half the room and that there be no more than 3 visitors a day. These requirements have the tendency to act as "screening devices," and are, thus prohibited by the ADA. These requirements are not applied equally to all students, i.e., those students who use wheelchairs and do not require attendant care are allowed to participate in the roommate program. Finally, modified or "special" programs for individuals with disabilities can not be used to exclude such individuals from the general programs. Participation in the "special" programs must be through by the individual's choice, and should not be a requirement.
Facts: Appellee, who has a brain disorder, applied for VR benefits from Georgia VR. Appellee received Social Security benefits and had previously received vocational benefits in Indiana. Georgia VR found him ineligible as he did not have a "substantial handicap to employment." After VR’s determination was upheld at fair hearing, appellee filed suit in state court. The superior court found that, due to Appellee's status as a Social Security Disability beneficiary, the "substantial handicap to employment" standard was improperly applied to his application. The superior court reversed VR’s decision and VR appealed.
Held: The Appellate Court held that, even though a separate set of eligibility criteria exists for social security disability beneficiaries, the regulation under which these criteria are promulgated permits a state to create additional eligibility criteria for social security disability beneficiaries. An applicant for vocational rehabilitation benefits must then meet both the federal and state requirements. Under the state statutory scheme, an individual must have a "substantial handicap to employment" in order to be considered as a candidate for vocational rehabilitation services. As the unchallenged administrative finding was that Appellee had no "substantial handicap to employment," he was not entitled to vocational rehabilitation benefits, and the judgment of the trial court was reversed.
Facts: A sixty-six year old individual with partial paralysis heard about a part-time carpentry position in the United Rehabilitation Workshop. He was told that referrals to the job came only through the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation. The complainant reported speaking with an OVR counselor who told him he was too old and too disabled since he did not have the capacity to work 8 hours a day and that therefore they could not refer him. A fair employment complaint was filed against OVR as an employer or employment agency.
Held: The fair employment agency has no jurisdiction. Although the OVR agency is an employer, it was not an employer in the context of the complaint. "[I]t would be a gross oversimplification to characterize OVR as "an employment agency under state law in light of the scope of the rehabilitation program the agency administers. Further, if an applicant is denied eligibility or a client denied a referral, there are federally required administrative appeal procedures. A claim of discrimination on the basis of age or disability was barred by federal regulations.
Facts: The Department, which had provided plaintiff assistance to the B.A. level, denied the client assistance with law school pursuant to an agency policy denying assistance beyond the B.A. level.
Held: The court concluded that the client was not disqualified pursuant to the policy. The court emphasized the statutory and regulatory definitions of "employability" as employment "consistent with his capacities and abilities." The court found that the "ability to be employed at any job is not equated with the definition of employability found in the federal regulations" and rejected the agency's argument that the client's ability to get a job with his B.A. conclusively meant that further VR services would not reasonably be expected to improve client's employability. This issue, the court held, is a factual question.
The case was remanded for further hearing because of inadequacies in the record (including the failure to include the IWRP as part of the hearing record). The court emphasized the central role of the IWRP and found that the standards relating to eligibility for rehabilitation services also apply to denial of services where denial is tantamount to a determination of ineligibility.
Facts: Petitioner is deaf and obtained a license to drive a truck with a tractor trailer. Federal DOT regulations prohibit deaf tractor trailer drivers; however, the Petitioner asked for a waiver of this requirement. When DOT refused to waive the requirement the Petitioner sued in District court alleging violation of Section 504 of the Rehab Act. Suit was bought under an implied right of action.
Held: In light of the existence of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), it rarely makes sense for a Court to find that a substantive statute creates a private right of action against the federal government for relief from unlawful regulatory action. Implied right of action exists for an injured person to enforce against a non-federal person. Further, APA is there to give order to the myriad of federal laws and agencies, and thus should be utilized.
Facts: Doe, a fifty-six year old male diagnosed with dysthymia, major depression, and a personality disorder was receiving VR services until VR terminated them "because '[his] medical condition interfered with carrying out the vocational plan.'" Doe's request that services be reinstated was denied. A fair hearing officer determined that Doe's case had been properly closed as there was no reasonable expectation that he would achieve his vocational objective. In addition, the hearing officer found that VR had failed to invoke the status quo provisions and failed to continue services until Doe's appeal was finally resolved. The VR commissioner affirmed. Doe filed suit in federal court claiming a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as VR (1) unlawfully terminated rehabilitative services pending Plaintiff’s administrative proceedings and failed to develop a sufficient IWRP, and (2) discriminated against him on the basis of his disability in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
Held: The district court held:
(1) The hearing officer’s determination that Doe’s rehabilitative services were properly terminated was quasi-judicial in nature and was given preclusive effect. This issue was dismissed.
(2) Since the status quo issue was favorably addressed by the hearing officer , and since Doe is not aggrieved by this decision, the court lacked jurisdiction of this issue and issue was dismissed.
(3) The IWRP allegation was not raised in the administrative proceeding, and was therefore dismissed under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(4) For purposes of Section 504 and the ADA, Plaintiff could not establish that he was "otherwise qualified" for VR benefits, in spite of his disabilities. VR's motion for summary judgment on these claims was granted.
Facts: A non-severely disabled rehabilitation client had her clothing and personal maintenance allowances (which were written into her IWRP) terminated, and her transportation allowances reduced, pursuant to decreased federal funding.
Held: The court found that the IWRP could be changed to reflect changed circumstances, as it was not a contract which bound the agency to a certain funding level. It upheld agency action inasmuch as: (a) federal regulations require the state agency to establish written policies covering scope, nature, conditions and procedures under which each agency service is provided (34 CFR Section 361.40(c); and (b) there was no evidence that deletion of the allowance would prevent the client from reaching her vocational goal.
Facts: Flight had multiple sclerosis, limited use of his upper body, and used a wheelchair. Under his IWRP, his employment goal was "homemaker." Flight petitioned VR for financial assistance to modify a van. VR tested Flight’s driving abilities and determined that he was too severely disabled to drive and that a van was not necessary to enable Flight to function as a homemaker. Though VR’s policies provided for financial assistance for such modifications only when necessary to assist attainment of a vocational goal, VR nevertheless offered to provide $4,000 for the modifications (VR’s limit when the client is to be a passenger only). Flight sought a waiver of the $4,000 limit, which was persistently denied by VR. Flight went ahead with modifications at a cost of $10,400 to which VR contributed $4,000. Flight sought relief in federal court, alleging that VR’s van modification policies violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to VR.
Held: The Second Circuit noted that "We have held that ‘[t]he [Rehabilitation] Act does not require all handicapped persons to be provided with identical benefits. ... The statute 'd[oes] not clearly establish an obligation to meet [a disabled person’s] particular needs vis-a-vis the needs of other handicapped individuals, but mandates only that services provided nonhandicapped individuals not be denied [to a disabled person] because he is handicapped.’ Thus, challenges to the allocation of resources among the disabled under the Rehabilitation Act are disfavored. The court held that Flight is not being denied a benefit which is made available to other individuals without disabilities and for which Flight is ‘otherwise qualified.’ The court stated that Flight’s denial was not based on his disability, but rather on the type of modification that he requested. The court thus denied Flight’s 504 and ADA claims and affirmed the district court opinion.
Facts: Fogel's IWRP vocational goal was to be a lawyer. The steps to that goal included assistance with undergraduate and law school costs. After Fogel completed college but before law school, the Commission changed its tuition policy and set a $2,000 annual cap. She pursued an administrative fair hearing for full funding arguing that once law school was a required service because in the IWRP, a blanket rule barring full funding violated the Rehabilitation Act. She sought review of the adverse hearing decision from the trial court and further appealed when the trial court upheld the hearing decision.
Held: The tuition funding limitation does not violate the Rehabilitation Act. Although a state agency cannot adopt a blanket policy which denies a service specifically required by the Federal Rehabilitation Act, courts have recognized the need for cost containment measures in providing required services. There was no proof that the tuition funding cap prevented her from attending law school or hindered her achievement of the vocational goal. In the court's view, the tuition cap was a flexible guideline and therefore not a regulation under state law -- which apparently meant that it did not have to be adopted following prescribed procedures before it could be given effect.
Facts: Pursuant to his IWRP, Fuller began an office occupation program at a vocational training facility where he earlier had taken a typing course. He was assisted by the award of a Pell grant and the VR agency paid for hearing aids. He ran into problems meeting the program requirements and was placed on academic probation. Mr. Fuller did not complete the required six credits during the probationary period and he withdrew from school. Reportedly Mr. Fuller did not cooperate with efforts toward alternative training. At the administrative hearing, Fuller's issues included unfair treatment, not being given maintenance assistance while going to school, considering wife's income in determining financial need, and procedural irregularities such as being asked to sign blank documents. Plaintiff appeals from the adverse hearing decision and the trial court decision upholding it.
Held: Upheld the hearing decision and trial court under an administrative review standard which looked to whether lawful procedures were used, whether the decision was within the agency's authority, whether the agency applied the correct statutory standards, whether the decision was clearly erroneous in light of reliable and substantial evidence, or whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion. The court noted that, at the hearing, Mr. Fuller "did not present any witnesses, evidence, other documents, or information that showed any unjust dealings toward him" by the agency, and that he had been involved in the development of the IWRP.
Facts: German, diagnosed as having a schizo-affective disorder with obsessive and paranoid traits, and in possession of a Ph.D. in history, sought vocational rehabilitation services from VR in order to attend law school. After taking into consideration his mental disability, other factors, and professional psychiatric opinions that vocational services were not feasible, VR determined that German would not reasonably be expected to benefit by further university education in terms of employability, and his application was denied. German then filed a complaint in federal court seeking relief in the form of a decree establishing his eligibility. His complaint alleged that VR (1) violated his rights under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, (2) violated his 14th Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection rights, and (3) was liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Washington law. The district court entered summary judgment against German on the first two claims and dismissed the third claim for lack of jurisdiction. The district court reasoned that German is not a person who is qualified in spite of his handicap and thus is not an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" for the purpose of Section 504. In addition, the court found that German was not denied VR services solely by reason of his handicap. In addition, the court found that the due process claim failed because there is no express constitutional right to VR services. German appealed.
Held: "The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that German failed to set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue of material fact that (1) he was an "otherwise qualified" handicapped person or (2) that he was denied services solely because of his handicap." The Ninth Circuit also found that German failed to show a genuine issue of material fact that he was deprived of rights under federal statutes or the Constitution, and that the district court properly concluded that German had no express constitutional right to VR benefits.
Facts: Petitioner has a traumatic brain injury which results in certain cognitive deficiencies, primarily manifested as a memory disorder. Ruled eligible for VR’s services, petitioner began recommended cognitive therapy at the Rusk Institute of Rehabilitative Medicine ("IRM"). Petitioner and IRM had fundamental differences regarding treatment of petitioner’s cognitive deficiencies. Petitioner sought to have VR sponsor his treatment in another cognitive remediation program. VR denied petitioner’s request because "he had not moved toward the achievement of a vocational goal," and because VR could not find a program that Medicare would finance. VR’s determination was upheld at fair hearing. Petitioner brought suit in state court. The trial court transferred the matter to the Appellate Court.
Held: The Appellate Court held that VR’s determination was supported by substantial evidence. The Appellate Court noted that the hearing officer was entitled to credit the VR counselor’s testimony that she discounted the opinions of petitioner’s experts because neither of them had contacted IRM to determine the type of treatment petitioner had already received and whether progress had been made. The court also noted that petitioner’s entire treatment team at IRM concurred in VR’s decision. The court stated that 29 U.S.C. § 720(a)(3)(C), while permitting the individual’s active participation in meaningful choices, does not allow the individual’s complete control over their programs. VR’s determination was affirmed.
Facts: Plaintiff appealed VR's decision to deny her reimbursement for transportation expenses.
Held: The Court of Appeals affirmed hearing officer's decision that Plaintiff's receipt of Pell Grant was a "comparable benefit" pursuant to 34 CFR Sec. 361.47(b)(4) which should be used to meet her transportation costs and VR was thus not obligated to reimburse the plaintiff for her transportation expenses.
Facts: Plaintiff was profoundly deaf and graduated from Gallaudet in Washington, D.C., with a bachelor's in English. Firth worked as a law firm messenger, a cashier at a Gallaudet bookstore, a busboy, and a runner for an engineering firm. After graduation he sent out at least 18 resumes without receiving one interview. He entered law school at Notre Dame and applied to the Indiana Office of Vocational Rehabilitation for the assistance of an interpreter. The interpreter was not satisfactory and Firth found another, although costlier interpreter. OVR refused to pay the difference. In his appeal letter, Firth asked for the full cost of the interpreter and, additionally, for reimbursement for tuition, books, transportation, and maintenance. The hearing officer found OVR should not have denied the interpreter request and ordered reimbursement. The other requests were sent back because Firth had not requested their inclusion in the IWRP. The OVR director ordered a second hearing on the issue of eligibility. The second decision found Mr. Firth eligible and again found Mr. Firth should be reimbursed for the interpreter. In addition, the decision ordered reimbursement for tuition and books. The OVR director issued an alternative decision finding Firth was employable in the fields of advertising, marketing and technical writing and therefore was not eligible. The trial court vacated the director's decision and reinstated the hearing officer's decision. The state appealed.
Held: In determining whether Mr. Firth's disability constitutes a "substantial handicap to employment" under the Act and therefore whether Mr. Firth is eligible for rehabilitation services, you look not to the applicant's present capacities and abilities but rather to the potential or future capabilities. Mr. Firth's ability to perform some types of employment did not render him ineligible for assistance to pursue post-graduate studies. Upholding the finding of eligibility, the case was remanded back to the agency (and the IWRP process) to determine what services he should receive.
Facts: Plaintiff was mentally retarded and earlier had been trained as a power sewing machine operator. She had been offered federal "excepted service" employment conditioned on her obtaining certification from the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation. She applied to the Pennsylvania OVR to become a client for certification to the "excepted service" employment. She was sent out by OVR for examinations. When she did not hear from the counselor about the results of the examinations and the status of her certification, the OVR was contacted. Her case had been closed and her counselor had retired. Her suit alleged the handling of her application violated the Rehabilitation Act and raised other issues around failure to issue a certification. The state sought to dismiss on procedural grounds.
Held: The complaint failed to state a cause of action. While no private right of action exists directly under Title I of the Rehabilitation Act, plaintiff could amend the complaint to assert a violation of Title I under Section 1983 to reach a hearing on the merits.
Facts: DRS refused to provide client Jones with interpreter services for his college classes.
Held: DRS was responsible for providing the interpreter services pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The court also held that Title I of the Rehabilitation Act does not imply a private right of action.
Facts: Jongquist was found eligible by the Department of Rehabilitation Services. His IWRP provided that he would attend the state university for a degree in business administration. The IWRP required that he assume a loan to cover tuition and maintenance costs. He objected and appealed. The ALJ ruled that Mr. Jongquist should not be required to get a loan to finance his education. The director reversed. Mr. Jongquist appealed and challenged the authority of the agency to require clients to take out loans in the absence of any regulations.
Held: "Federal regulations provide that if a state program takes into consideration an individual's financial need, the state must maintain written policies in order to provide equitable treatment to those similarly situated." State law requires that any rule of general applicability be promulgated and adopted in accord with the state Administrative Procedures Act. Concluded that a case-by-case approach in the absence of properly adopted regulations would be inappropriate and therefore ordered the state to pay Jongquist for "the training expenses for which he has not received grants or direct DRS reimbursement."
Facts: Plaintiff brought suit in federal court, contending he was discriminated against by VR based on his religious beliefs and that he was denied vocational rehabilitation because of his refusal to be examined by a psychiatrist or psychologist which was based on his religious beliefs. Plaintiff brought this action under the employment provisions (Title I) of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.
Held: The district court found the case was not frivolous. The court noted that VR is clearly a "public entity" and "despite the fact that the plaintiff was seeking vocational rehabilitation rather than actually applying for a job, it is arguable that what is considered discrimination in employment practices (Subchapter I) may well be considered discrimination by entities providing services (Subchapter II)."
However, as Plaintiff had not obtained a "right-to-sue" letter from the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), the court dismissed the case without prejudice to allow plaintiff the opportunity to comply with the ADA Title I requirements.
Facts: Mallett brought this action challenging VR's action to discontinue college tuition assistance after he requested tuition assistance to attend law school. VR's determination was upheld at fair hearing. Mallet brought suit in federal court, contending that VR violated his rights under the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, he claimed that VR's policy disfavoring funding graduate school education offends his right to an IWRP pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 722(b), that VR failed to establish that he would be unable to meet his career goal in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 722(b), and that VR did not provide proper administrative remedies by refusing his request to submit additional evidence in contravention of 29 U.S.C. § 722(d). As Title I does not explicitly provide for a private right of action, Mallett asserted his claims under § 722, arguing it creates an implied private right of action. Mallett also raised claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing Section 722 establishes enforceable rights, and under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, alleging that VR discriminated against him because of his disability. The district court dismissed Mallett's claims and Mallett appealed.
Held: The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of Mallett's claims under 29 U.S.C. § 722. It recognized that Title I neither expressly provides a right of action, nor indicates that one is implied. However, the Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of Mallett's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and remanded for further proceedings, stating that a "private right of action under Sec. 1983 for Title I of the Rehabilitation Act complements the existing administrative procedures without creating overlapping systems of review... Thus, Mallett may challenge whether DVR's policy disfavoring funding graduate school education violates his right to an IWRP under Sec. 1983."
Facts: Petitioner, who suffers from traumatic brain injures went to OVR for services. During the application process, the OVR counselor tried to contact the Petitioner by telephone to set up appointments. When the Petitioner did not respond to messages left on answering machine, the counselor wrote the Petitioner a letter, stating her case would be closed unless she responded to the messages. Later, the Petitioner received a letter stating that her case was being closed. Petitioner appealed and asserted that OVR was violating Section 504 of the Rehab Act.
Held: Programs receiving federal aid must operate in a manner that it is readily accessible to handicapped persons. Since the Petitioner's disability had a bearing on why she was not cooperating, OVR should have made reasonable accommodations so that the Petitioner could have meaningfully participated in the application process. The public VR program cannot exclude someone because of their disability. By failing to accommodate the Petitioner's disability, OVR was excluding the Petitioner based on her disability.
Facts: Challenged VR agency's policy of prohibiting reimbursement for "factory-installed" automotive equipment. The District Court granted the defendant's Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim. Appeal was taken to the 2nd Circuit.
Held: Claims under Title I of the Rehabilitation Act can be asserted in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 actions.
Facts: The claimant who had been labeled a "paranoid schizophrenic in remission" quit work to go to law school. The agency found the claimant ineligible for services.
Held: The court found that the claimant was not severely handicapped and therefore not entitled to priority services. The court also found the claimant ineligible because there was no substantial handicap to employability.
Facts: Plaintiff's IWRP goal was to be an attorney. After being supported as an undergraduate, the state imposed an annual cap on tuition and maintenance. As a consequence, Mr. McGuire incurred a debt of $25,000 for law school. Plaintiff initially filed suit in state court appealing an adverse hearing decision but that suit was dismissed as untimely filed. This action challenged the caps as discriminatory on equal protection and Section 504 grounds. Plaintiff claimed first that, contrary to the Rehabilitation Act's priority for serving those with severe disabilities, the cap had the effect of discriminating against the more severely disabled, and second that the higher cap for blind persons subjected non-blind to disparate treatment.
Held: Claims that should have been raised in the dismissed action could not be addressed here. The tuition cap was not discriminatory on the basis of severity. "[T]he percentage of reimbursement ... any individual receives under the cap will be a product of many factors unrelated to the severity of the individual's disability -- most obvious being tuition expense." However, "defendants have failed to establish that the state has a rational basis for favoring visually-impaired individuals over its other rehabilitative clients..."
Facts: Plaintiff was found ineligible for additional college aid because her disability (alcoholism) did not prevent her from attending school.
Held: The court held that she can be found ineligible for this reason. However, it is improper for the agency to deem her present job as a waitress suitable employment within her capacities and abilities, given her goals. The agency must measure the suitability of employment and the person's capacities and abilities against possibilities of attainment of employment and the person's goals.
Facts: This dispute began more than ten years ago when Minnesota’s licensing agency applied, pursuant to the Randolph-Sheppard Vending Stand Act, for a vending permit for the Veterans Affairs Medical Center ("the Center"). The application was rejected by the Department of Veteran’s Affairs and the Veterans’ Canteen Service (collectively, "VCS"), which claimed to be exempt from Randolph-Sheppard. An arbitration panel ("the Panel") held that VCS was subject to Randolph-Sheppard. The Panel decided that Minnesota’s licensed blind vendor Dennis Groshel should pay VCS a commission on vending sales, and that VCS does not have the right to install and operate its own vending machines at the Center. The district court decided commission payments violate Randolph-Sheppard. VCS appealed to the Eighth Circuit, and the decision was affirmed. See Minnesota Dep’t of Jobs & Training v. Riley, 18 F.3d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Riley I"). In Riley I, the Eighth Circuit also held Randolph-Sheppard applies to VCS and that commission payments, like any limitation on a blind vendor’s operation, are unlawful unless approved by the Secretary of Education. VCS offered VR a permit, but only if VR agreed that VCS could install competing vending machines at the VA Medical Center. VR filed suit in district court which granted VR;s ;motion to enforce the Panel's decision. VCS appealed, again claiming exemption from Randolph-Sheppard.
Held: The Eighth Circuit held that its previous decision in Riley I foreclosed VCS’ claim for exemption from Randolph-Sheppard. The court held that, unless VCS gets the Secretary of Education’s approval, VCS may not insist that VR accept the presence of VCS vending machines at the VA Medical Center as the price of VR obtaining the vendor permit.
The Eighth Circuit also held that: (1) the Panel was within its statutory authority (' do) when it decided that competing VCS machines at the Center would violate Randolph-Sheppard, and (2) the fact that the Panel’s decision approving the commissions was overturned in no way affects the Panel’s decision regarding competing machines.
Facts: Mosholder was an eligible ORS client and her IWRP indicated a bachelor's degree was necessary. She asked that ORS assist her with tuition in a private college to the same extent it would if she were attending a public university. The balance of the tuition and other costs would be covered by a scholarship and assistance from the proceeds of a loan taken out by her parents. Her tuition request was denied. The final administrative hearing decision and trial court upheld the ORS decision and Mosholder appealed.
Held: Under federal regulations, "if the state chooses to consider the financial need of an individual in determining the extent of their participation in the cost of vocational rehabilitation services, the state must maintain written policies...." (Emphasis supplied.) Ohio had none. Though the family was willing to take out a loan to enable Mosholder to attend the private college, the state cannot require them to make an equal financial contribution towards the cost of the public college. The requirement that Ohio provide services at the least cost consistent with an individual's disability does not mean that ORS can totally deny tuition assistance because of attending a private school. The court ordered ORS to provide the amount of tuition assistance it would have provided were she attending the public college.
Facts: Murdy, an individual with a visual impairment, attended college with VR sponsorship. Pursuant to Murdy's IWRP, VR was to fund eight semesters of college. After eight semesters, Murdy was several credits short of obtaining his degree and requested that VR fund his last semester. When VR refused, Murdy requested a hearing at which VR’s decision was affirmed. Murdy filed suit in state court.
Held: The state court upheld VR's denial of funding. In rejecting Murdy's assertion that VR violated the Rehabilitation Act by failing to reasonably accommodate him and by denying him meaningful VR services, the court stated that Murdy had raised this issue for the first time on appeal and therefore waived the issue. Additionally, the court noted that Murdy had never requested any accommodation, nor was he unaware of the time restriction on funding. The court rejected Murdy’s assertion that he was denied due process, concluding Murdy was given adequate notice and several opportunities to challenge VR’s funding decision. In evaluating Murdy’s argument that VR’s eight-semester funding policy was unrealistic and inflexible, the court determined exceptions could be granted in appropriate circumstances and the requirement that students finish an eight-semester program in eight semesters was not unrealistic. Additionally, the court examined the evidence and concluded the policy had not been administered unfairly in Murdy’s case.
Facts: Consumer had an IWRP goal of "Legal Services and Related" and VR provided consumer with funding for a Bachelors degree. VR denied Consumer's request, made prior to obtaining her Bachelors degree, to fund law school. The IHO's decision in VR's favor was accepted by the VR Commissioner and the trial court affirmed. Consumer appealed to the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
Held: Affirmed. VR provided consumer with the necessary services to achieve her IWRP goal as the goal was "employment in the legal field and not attendance at law school." Although the court cited approvingly to Chirico v. Office of Vocational and Educational Services for Individuals with Disabilities, 211 A. D.2d 258, lv. denied 86 N.Y.2d 705 which held that the Rehabilitation Act mandates that consumers be provided with services to reach their "highest level of achievement," the court found that this had been done for consumer as she was placed "on a footing equal with non-disabled persons in the same field." The court added: "like her non-disabled counterparts who may harbor the same ambition, she will have to seek various avenues of financing to achieve that goal, such as student loans, grants, scholarships and/or work-produced savings."
N.B.: Leave to appeal this case has been sought from the New York Court of Appeals.
Facts: Petitioner, an individual with cerebral palsy and learning disabilities, as well as an orthopedic impairment requiring the use of crutches, determined that the Vocational Independence Program at New York Institute of Technology ("VIP") was the only appropriate program that met her needs. She was accepted to VIP and applied to VR for financial sponsorship. VR would not sponsor her enrollment at VIP because it was not an "approved program." Petitioner attended VIP anyway, and sought a fair hearing to challenge VR’s denial. The hearing officer found that, pursuant to state regulations, VR was only required to use "appropriate vendors." Since VIP was entirely appropriate for Ms. Odom’s needs, the hearing officer ordered VR to sponsor her attendance there and to reimburse her for all expenses paid from the date of her matriculation. VR’s Commissioner reversed the decision as clearly erroneous since it was contrary to the state regulations which require that a vendor must first be approved before it provides services which can be paid for by VR. Petitioner brought suit in state court challenging not only VR’s refusal to fund petitioner’s participation in the VIP program, but also to grant VIP approved-vendor status. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for reimbursement and held that petitioner lacked standing to litigate the second issue. Petitioner appealed.
Held: The Appellate Court held that, since the state regulations required that VR programs first be approved before VR will approve reimbursement, (1) VR did not err in denying reimbursement for non-approved vocational rehabilitation program, and (2) petitioner did not have standing to challenge refusal by VR to certify vocational program as provider. The court stated: "there is no concomitant right to demand participation in programs not offered by [VR] ... when other authorized services addressing such needs can [or may] be provided.... Hence, until it can be conclusively determined that VIP is, in fact, the only appropriate program for petitioner, we must conclude that the current challenge...is premature."
Facts: Petsinger was employed by VR as a vocational rehabilitation counselor until he was terminated for alleged terroristic threats. He subsequently became disabled, allegedly as a result of the circumstances surrounding his discharge. He applied to VR for services and was found eligible. Petsinger expressed his vocational goal as returning to work at VR, as well as other goals. Petsinger's IWRP was never completed, and services were not provided. Petsinger requested a fair hearing on the denial of services. During the course of a several day hearing, VR worked with Petsinger to continue developing his IWRP. Several services were agreed to and several were denied by VR. The hearing examiner ordered VR to provide services it had agreed to provide, but denied Petsinger's request for the services VR had denied. Petsinger filed suit in state court, arguing that his due process rights were violated by the hearing examiner, that his right to a fair hearing was denied because the Executive Director, who had filed a criminal complaint against him when he was a VR employee, did not recuse himself from acting on the hearing examiner's recommended decision, and that the hearing examiner erred as a matter of law in placing the burden of proof on him.
Held: The state court affirmed VR's determination. The court found that Petsinger was accorded due process by the hearing examiner and that the Executive Director actually took a neutral role in choosing not to review the decision, and, moreover, could not delegate authority to make a final decision, and thus could not have legally recused himself from acting in Petsinger's case. The court also found that the only burden placed upon Petsinger was that of identifying services he wanted VR to provide and that this was not incorrect as a matter of law, because there is no way VR could know what Petsinger wanted until he specified same.
Facts: Petsinger, a VR consumer, requested a change of counselors. VR denied the request. Petsinger filed a written appeal, which was forwarded by VR to the State-wide Impartial Hearing Services (SIHS) with which VR had contracted to provide a hearing system. VR later withdrew the request for a hearing from SIHS. The SIHS hearing officer informed VR that she believed VR lacked the authority to unilaterally withdraw Petsinger's request for a hearing. The withdrawn appeal was never re-submitted. Petsinger, along with the Center for Disability Law and Policy, filed suit in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that VR failed to comply with the appellate review procedures set forth in the Rehabilitation Act. Both parties moved for summary judgment.
Held: The court denied VR's motion for summary judgment and granted plaintiffs' counter motion for summary judgment. VR was ordered not to interfere with Petsinger's right to an impartial hearing. Having previously found that denial of an appeals hearing invokes a property interest subject to protection by the due process clause, the court found that VR "arbitrarily den[ied] Petsinger due process in withdrawing his appeal from SIHS." The court declined to grant plaintiffs declaratory relief in the form of an order requiring VR to submit a plan for compliance in the future with the Rehabilitation Act's hearing procedures as the court found this to be the only case where VR ;had interfered with a consumer's right to a fair hearing. Plaintiffs' counsel was permitted to submit a petition for an award of attorney's fees within 14 days.
Facts: Phan, an eligible VR consumer, was denied services to attend an out-of-state sectarian school. It was VR’s policy to fund both in-state and out-of-state non-sectarian schools, but only in-state sectarian schools. Phan’s federal court action raised claims under the Establishment and Equal Protection (including the right to travel) Clauses of the United States Constitution. Phan also argued that, even if tuition aid to attend St. Andrews was validly denied, he still should receive payment for books, transportation and related expenses. The District Court granted VR’s motion to dismiss and Phan appealed.
Held:The Fourth Circuit cited to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 106 S. Ct. 748 (1986) which held that whether to fund religious studies along with other post-secondary education lies within a permissible zone of accommodation of religion but is not mandatory. Moreover, because VR allowed some state monies to flow to sectarian schools, the Court found no "hostility to religion."
The Court dismissed Phan’s right to travel claim as the right generally deals with states preventing immigration into the State rather than challenges such as this one which deal with discouraging immigration from the State.
The Court also discussed Phan’s claim that his right freely to exercise his religion was violated as numerous other state-sponsored religious options remained available. The Court clearly stated that "[t]he state ... is not obliged to provide Phan with the optimal situation."
Phan also argued that, even if the VR provisions implicate no fundamental rights, taken together, they are irrational. The Court remanded the case to look into VR’s rationale for its policy.
Finally, the Court found nothing in Virginia’s Constitution to bar Phan’s request for reimbursement for incidental expenses.
Facts: OVR denied request for sponsorship through undergraduate college and law school. Denial was upheld at the administrative hearing. ALJ held that, "although petitioner's career as a paralegal may not be the highest level obtainable by her, it was 'suitable employment' consistent with her capacities or her abilities and the goal of the [vocational rehabilitation] program." New York's trial court transferred case to the Appellant Division.
Held: ALJ applied an improper standard. Test is whether vocational services "will maximize employability, independence and integration into the community," whether Polkabla "could maximize her employability by pursuing" the goal of becoming an attorney. Test applies even though Polkabla may have initially identified being a paralegal as her vocational goal. A remedial statute is to be liberally construed to achieve its purposes. The broad mandate set out in the Rehabilitation Act takes precedence over the narrowed and restricted agency interpretation.
Facts: Petitioner applied to VESID (Vocational and Educational Services for Individuals with Disabilities) for services. The stated vocational goal was social work, specifically therapeutic counseling. An IWRP was developed with the goal of obtaining an Associate's degree. Later, the IWRP was amended when it was determined that employment opportunities would be limited by an Associates degree. Hence, the vocational goal was changed to a BA degree. When the Petitioner again asked to change the IWRP to state the goal of a Master's degree, VESID refused.
Held: Petitioner, who wanted to amend IWRP did not need a Masters degree in order to achieve the stated IWRP goal. A Master's degree is not required to fully achieve the stated IWRP goal. While the added credential would certainly entitle Petitioner to start her career at a higher level, her achievement of her IWRP goal would adequately empower her to ultimately reach that level. Section 701(b) of the Rehab Act does not require that VESID sponsor every possible credential desired by Petitioner.
Facts: Following a dispute concerning conditions of participating in a vocational rehabilitation program, plaintiff was afforded an informal "administrative review." In the review, plaintiff indicated he did not intend to comply with the conditions and the administrator in a written opinion recommended that "the agency stick to its guns and that the steps outlined be followed absolutely before further work is attempted with this man." Plaintiff was advised of his right to a fair hearing and that his file had been closed for "failure to cooperate." Plaintiff filed suit alleging he had been unlawfully denied rehabilitation benefits.
Held: No private right of action directly under Title I, but Section 1983 could enforce federal rights under Title I. While exhaustion of administrative remedies normally would be required, in this case, it arguably would be futile, and plaintiff was allowed to proceed to the merits.
Facts: Interpreter services provided to the client by the vocational rehabilitation agency were terminated. The agency's position was that VR would not provide interpreter services where another agency (in this case, a local college) had an obligation to do so under Section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act.
Held: The policy violated the Rehabilitation Act's mandate to provide services on an individualized basis when the policy was invoked without considering whether interpreter services were in fact available. "Only if a 'similar benefit' program provides the necessary services for a particular client is the state vocational rehabilitation agency relieved of its statutory responsibilities." The court also held that once a severely handicapped person was accepted as a client, the agency's discretion narrows considerably. VR is "required to provide the client with at least those services enumerated in the Act which are necessary to assist the handicapped person to achieve his or her vocational goal." Interpreter services are included among mandatory services in the Act.
Facts: Georgia had a rule that only clients who were receiving rehabilitation services away from their home or in their home community were entitled to maintenance support.
Held: Although the state had considerable discretion in how it ran its program, the rule outlined above was not rationally related to the Act's paramount goal of providing rehabilitation services "which are tailored to each individual's need," and was therefore invalid. The court indicated that the state could establish guidelines to aid in the individualized exercise of discretion.
Facts: Petitioner, diagnosed with cerebral palsy, attended a Pennsylvania university under VR sponsorship to pursue petitioner’s vocational goal, as reflected in her IWRP to pursue a Bachelor’s degree in social work. Petitioner experienced severe problems transitioning from home life to independent living and ultimately withdrew from attendance. It was then recommended by a Disabled Student Service person at the school that she participate in an independent living skills program in Pennsylvania. Petitioner was denied funding for the program by VR as it contended that the program was not primarily vocational and was therefore outside the realm of services that VR was authorized to provide. A hearing officer found, however, that the program was an appropriate adjunct to petitioner’s IWRP and ordered that the IWRP be amended to include a 15-week placement therein, contingent upon petitioner’s acceptance for re-enrollment at the university. VR’s Commissioner annulled the hearing officer's determination as contrary to law, and directed VR’s staff to immediately meet with petitioner to facilitate an appropriate referral. Petitioner filed suit in state court. The trial court transferred the matter to the appellate court.
Held: The appellate court affirmed the VR commissioner's decision;, noting that he correctly found the hearing officer's decision to be "clearly erroneous" based on clear and convincing evidence, in conformance with 29 U.S.C. § 722(d)(3)(C)(i). The court found that (1) The requested program was not an approved vendor of rehabilitation services, therefore VR was not authorized to contract with it to provide such services. While regulations provide for temporary approval of such vendors, the premature direction by the hearing officer to place petitioner in that program, without reviewing whether a temporary approval would be appropriate under the circumstances, was properly found contrary to law by the VR commissioner. (2) The hearing officer’s order to amend the IWRP to mandate petitioner's placement in the program, without specifying the VR services which program would provide to facilitate petitioner's achieving her IWRP goal, was contrary to the state VR regulations. (3) There was sufficient proof in the record to support the VR commissioner’s determination that the program was predominantly focused on the provision of independent living services which, as part of New York’s federally approved plan, is funded separately from VR’s vocational rehabilitation funds.
Facts: The case attempted to establish a right under 42 U.S.C. 15422 (concerning rehabilitation rights of Social Security Title II disability beneficiaries) to rehabilitation services without regard for financial need.
Held: The court held that Section 422, which is intended to provide states with financial incentives to rehabilitate Title II recipients, created no enforceable rights. According to the decision, the regulation, which provides that vocational rehabilitation services shall be available without regard for financial need, did not create an enforceable right under federal civil right laws where the right was not implicit in Section 422.
Facts: Plaintiff was a former VR consumer who requested an opportunity to view the entire contents of his closed VR file. VR allowed only a limited review of his file on the basis that in the professional judgment of the assistant district office supervisor, release of some of the records to Plaintiff would be harmful, unless released to him in the context of a therapeutic relationship.
At the time VR decided to withhold the information sought by Plaintiff, 45 C.F.R. 1361.47(a)(5) was in effect:
Upon written request, information may be released to the client or, as appropriate, his parent guardian or other representative, and shall be released to such client, . . . for purposes in connection with any proceeding or action . . . : Provided, (i) That only such information as is relevant to the needs of the client shall be released, and (ii) in the case of medical or phycological [sic] information, the knowledge of which may be harmful to the client, such information will be released to the parent, guardian, or other representative of the client by the State agency, or to the client by a physician or by a licensed or certified psychologist. . .
Plaintiff brought suit in state Court. The trial court held this regulation specifically exempted the records sought by Plaintiff, and concluded that the records were also exempt from disclosure pursuant to the state's freedom of information law which provides that a public body may exempt from disclosure as a public record, records or information specifically described and exempted from disclosure by statute. Plaintiff appealed.
Held: The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that, since agency regulations promulgated by the federal government have the force of federal statutory law, reliance upon a federal regulation to exempt a document is proper. That disclosure of the requested information may have been harmful was found to be supported by both the testimony of the assistant district supervisor, who is also a professional counselor, and the testimony of a psychiatrist.
Facts: Plaintiff appealed VR's decision to reduce and ultimately terminate his university education assistance benefits based on a needs test.
Held: Court of Appeals reversed circuit court and hearing officer's decision that VR had acted correctly within the scope of VR rules and regulations concerning the Plaintiff's request for benefits. The Court of Appeals found that, while the Rehabilitation Act granted VR discretion to establish a needs test, the Act obligated VR to adopt written policies regarding the test's implementation if it chose to establish one. Since the adoption of written policies about the needs test was mandatory, VR was required to have followed the state's Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and implemented the needs test through a formal rule-making process. The court also found that, even without the Rehabilitation Act's mandate of written policies, the state's APA required written policies, thereby invoking the APA's formal rulemaking procedure.
Facts: In 1977, the Veterans’ Canteen Service and the Department of Veterans Affairs (collectively VCS) and VR negotiated an agreement allowing VR to furnish vending services at the VA Medical Center in St. Cloud, Minnesota. Rather than operating under a Randolph-Sheppard permit, VR agreed to operate the vending facility under a renewable contract that required VR to pay the VCS sales commissions from the vending facility. Since 1985, the vending facility has been operated by Dennis Groshel. Although VR renewed the contract several times, when it was time to renegotiate the contract in 1986, VR applied for a permit to operate the facility under Randolph-Sheppard which included a term requiring VCS to issue the permit for an indefinite period of time, pursuant to Randolph-Sheppard, 34 C.F.R. § 395.35(b). The proposed permit also did not allow VCS to collect commissions based on the vendor’s sales. VCS denied the application, claiming it was exempt from Randolph-Sheppard.
VR filed a complaint with the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) for arbitration. The arbitration panel concluded that VCS is subject to Randolph-Sheppard and must give priority to blind vendors, but held a negotiated agreement could be substituted for the permit process. Although the panel ordered the parties to negotiate, no agreement could be reached. The panel then ordered the parties to enter a five-year contract for the operation of the vending facility, subject to renegotiation. The panel also concluded that VCS could impose a 17% commission on the vendor’s gross sales.
The district court reviewed the panel’s decision and granted summary judgment in favor of VR. The district court held that VCS was subject to Randolph-Sheppard, and that, if VCS approves the permit, VCS must issue the permit for an indefinite time period and VCS cannot charge commissions on sales from the blind vendor’s vending operation unless they are approved by the DOE Secretary. VCS appealed.
Held: The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Randolph-Sheppard’s plain language provides that Randolph-Sheppard applies to federal departments, agencies, and instrumentalities in control of any federal property and thus clearly applies to VCS. The court also noted that "[n]either the [Randolph-Sheppard] Act nor the regulations permit the VCS to pick and choose which of the Act’s governing regulations to follow."
Facts: Consumer, a triple amputee, had requested and received hand controls from VR in 1979 which VR subsequently transferred to a new van in 1987. When the hand controls became irreparable in 1995, consumer requested another set. VR, applying an economic needs test, denied consumer's request, stating he earned too much money. IHO decision favoring VR was upheld by VR Commissioner. Consumer filed for judicial review by the Tennessee Chancery Court, Twentieth Judicial District, Davison County, Part II.
Held: Reversed. VR's economic needs policy which was set forth in VR's policy manual was a rule subject to the rulemaking provisions of Tennessee's Uniform Administrative Procedures Act which mandates notice of hearing, a hearing, filing with the secretary of state and approval by the Attorney General. VR acted arbitrarily and capriciously by not informing consumer about the economic needs test, by disregarding the economic needs test in 1987 when it assisted consumer and by failing to consider whether application of the economic needs test constituted an undue hardship for consumer. The court ordered VR to provide consumer with "whatever benefits he would be eligible for in the absence of an application of the economic needs test."
Facts: Petitioner is a disabled individual (psychiatric/orthopedic) who applied to OVR for services. Specifically, Petitioner sought financial aid to pay educational expenses for schooling at Clarion University while pursuing an Associates degree in accounting. Later, she sought assistance to pursue a BA degree. She was found eligible and received a BA degree in May, 1991. When the Petitioner stated her desire to amend her IWRP to include assistance in getting a Master’s degree, OVR refused her request.
Held: The Court affirmed the Executive Director's decision (which overturned the Hearing Officer's findings), i.e., the Rehab Act does not require that the highest level of education be granted in every case in providing an individual with a disability vocational rehabilitation services. The goal is to obtain suitable employment and the scope of services should relate to the individual's vocational disability. OVR met the standard of proof by providing sufficient evidence to support the Executive Director's finding, i.e., the Rehab Act does not require that OVR fund every level of education to be pursued. Rather, OVR only need fund what is related to the individual's degree of vocational disability and what OVR can do to afford the individual the ability to secure employment consistent with his/her capacities and abilities. Since OVR put forth evidence that the Petitioner could get a job with a BA degree in accounting, OVR had met the intent of the Act.
Facts: The case involved an attack on the state agency's failure to provide hearings when terminating services provided in an extended evaluation.
Held: The court did not reach the merits. However, the court did not appear to distinguish between termination from an extended evaluation and termination of eligibility in terms of due process rights held by clients. The court held that the plaintiffs were not obligated to exhaust their administrative remedies (i.e., to participate in an administrative fair hearing) in order to bring this civil rights action.
Facts: Petitioner is a 17 year old senior who suffers from ITP which is a serious autoimmune disease which affect the blood system. Persons with ITP are susceptible to life threatening bleeding and hemorrhaging. Petitioner was in a class and accidentally cut herself with an exacto knife. Petitioner then became extremely agitated and fearful and was deemed "inconsolable" by the school staff and administrators. The Petitioner finally calmed down when her mother arrived. However, the next day she was expelled for her behavior. Although the Petitioner did apologize when she came back, the school had already decided on a course of action.
Held: The ADA is designed to prevent blind adherence to policies and standards which can result in the failure to reasonably accommodate a person with a disability. Here the Petitioner's disability had a bearing upon her reaction which may seem outrageous, but when taken with her extreme fear due to her disability is reasonable. Thus, the school had a duty to reasonably accommodate the Petitioner in addressing her behavior. School did not address the issue of whether Petitioner's behavior had a bearing on her reaction which may seem "outrageous." However, in light of the Petitioner's extreme fear due to her disability it would seem reasonable.
Summary: The plaintiff and the Department of Human Services agreed on an Individualized Written Rehabilitation Program (IWRP) that established an employment goal in the field of computer animation. The Department of Human Services only agreed to pay the rate of tuition at an in-state school. Plaintiff requested that the Department pay for tuition for an out-of-state school that cost more and was more prestigious. The Department denied this request. The Department thought the in-state school was comparable to the out-of-state school. The chancery court ruled in favor of the Department. Plaintiff appealed.
Held: The court of appeals ruled in favor of the Department of Human Services. One of the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act is "to empower individuals with disabilities to maximize employment." The plaintiff argued that this language meant that the Department had to offer him services that will increase his employability to the utmost extent, thereby allowing him to reach the highest level of employment. The court rejected his claim, adopting the approach of courts which hold that the "maximization" language in the Rehabilitation Act requires "‘empowerment’ toward, rather than ‘achievement’ of, ‘maximum employment’" for people with disabilities. A state only had to provide the client with the tools to compete with people without disabilities, so they might have a chance to achieve their maximum employment. The court reasoned that such a requirement would prevent states from providing adequate services to other people with disabilities. As a result, the court held that the Department of Human Services only had to pay the rate of the in-state school rather than the rate of the out-of-state school because the state school would equip him with meaningful and gainful employment in the field of computer animation.
Facts: The plaintiffs (Toise and Dressler) have severe learning disabilities. They both qualified for assistance from the bureau of rehabilitation services ("VR"). Toise requested tuition assistance from VR and was denied her request. An impartial hearing officer (IHO) reversed the VR agency’s decision. The VR director undertook a review of the IHO’s decision and reversed it. Dressler wanted VR to fund an out-of-state, on-campus vocational training program. VR replied that this was contrary to their policy. The IHO issued a decision in support of VR, and this decision was adopted by the VR director.
Both plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court. The trial court determined that the plaintiffs did not have a right to appeal the decisions of VR and its director, and so their appeals were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs’ appeals were consolidated on the parties’ motion and the Appellate Court affirmed. The plaintiffs’ petition to the Supreme Court of Connecticut for certification was granted, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over these administrative appeals?"
Held: The Appellate Court decision was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Recognizing that cases which are not "contested" are generally not appealable to the Superior Court, the Supreme Court sought to determine whether the plaintiffs’ administrative hearings before VR may be properly characterized as contested cases. Resolution of that issue depended upon a determination of which version of the State’s General Statutes regarding VR appeals applied - the version in effect at the time that the cases were originally filed which merely discussed an agency administrative review, or the version of the statute as subsequently amended which specifically countenances an appeal to the Superior Court. Applying established principles of statutory construction, the context in which the amendment was enacted, and the legislative history accompanying the amendments, the Supreme Court held that the amendment was a clarifying act that should be applied retroactively.
Facts: Consumer sought sponsorship for law school which was denied by VR. IHO found in consumer's favor but IHO decision was overturned by VR Commissioner as being "clearly erroneous" as consumer failed to cooperate with VR in jointly developing her IWRP. The trial court affirmed the Commissioner's decision. Consumer appealed to the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
Held: Affirmed. IHO's decision is contrary to the requirement that an IWRP be jointly developed by consumer and the VR counselor as consumer "unilaterally determined that law school was her goal and demanded that [VR] fund that goal."
Facts: Plaintiff had quadriplegia and was respirator dependent. He lived in a nursing facility. There was no dispute about his eligibility for vocational rehabilitation services, but the agency denied the client's request for full-time attendant care which would enable Turbedsky to live outside the institution. Evidence at the administrative hearing established that it was difficult to study in the nursing home, that he would do better in school if all his time outside of school were not spent in a nursing home. Evidence established that comparably disabled persons did better educationally and vocationally outside an institution.
Held: The Act requires the provision of any service necessary to render the handicapped person employable, including "maintenance." "Maintenance" includes attendant care and other services necessary to derive the full benefit of the vocational services. Full-time attendant care was necessary in order to derive the full benefit of the college education. The court held that the state agency had no discretion to deny services required under the Act.
Facts: Plaintiff appealed VR's decision refusing to allow him to amend his IWRP. Plaintiff's original IWRP indicated that Plaintiff's goal would be to obtain employment as a computer programmer/analyst. One month later the IWRP was revised to state that his goal would be to obtain employment. Several months later the Plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to show his goal as establishing a small business of advertising and marketing a motivational tape. VR found the Plaintiff's goal problematic and suggested amending the IWRP to show the goal of determining whether VR will assist the Plaintiff in establishing the small business. The Plaintiff rejected this proposal.
Held: The Court of Appeals upheld the hearing officer's decision that the proposed business was not likely to lead to gainful employment and that any proposed amendment was to be decided jointly with VR.
Facts: Petitioner applied to the Washington Commission for the Blind for vocational rehabilitation assistance. At the time, he was attending a private Christian college seeking to become a pastor, missionary or youth director. The Commission denied aid on the ground that it was prohibited by the Washington State Constitution, and this ruling was upheld on administrative appeal. Petitioner then brought an action in state court, which affirmed the administrative ruling based on the state constitution, holding that the provision of aid to petitioner would have the primary effect of advancing religion in violation of that Clause. The state supreme court affirmed based on the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Petitioner appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Held: The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The court held that, on the record, extension of aid under the Washington vocational rehabilitation program to finance petitioner's training at the Christian college would not advance religion in a manner inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. As assistance provided under the Washington program is paid directly to the student who then transmits it to the educational institution of his or her choice, the program was found not to be skewed towards religion and it created no financial incentive for students who undertake sectarian education. Moreover, the court noted that nothing in the record indicated that, if petitioner succeeded, any significant portion of the aid expended by VR will end up flowing to religious education. The court also held that it was inappropriate to view any aid ultimately flowing to the Christian college as resulting from a state action sponsoring or subsidizing religion. The mere circumstance that petitioner has chosen to use neutrally available state aid to help pay for his religious education similarly was found not to confer any message of state endorsement of religion.
Facts: Appealing refusal to purchase computer equipment needed for employment and t do so in a timely manner. Mr. Zinger is an accountant who had received services prior to his employment. He had lost a prior appeal in which he had requested hardware and software prior to his employment, claiming they were necessary for him to find work. He was fired from that job for reasons unrelated to the equipment.
Held: Res Judicata did not bar this appeal, because the agency’s prior ruling had specifically left the door open to subsequent review of the computer issue. It was not necessary to the maximization of Mr. Zingher’s employment potential that he be granted the requested equipment, because he had already been given substantial assistance and expert opinion supported the conclusion that hardware and software configuration would depend on the systems used by the eventual employer. Although delay should be avoided in providing needed equipment, it need not be purchased because the lack of equipment had not lost him the job and a subsequent employer might have different needs.
INDEX TO SELECTED CAP CASES
Administrative Procedure
Fogel, Spear
Attendant Care
Turbedsky
Caps on Services
Fogel
Choice
Murphy, Tourville, ?????
Client Cooperation
Beason, Manley, Ryans, Tourville
Comparable Services and Benefits (see also Similar Benefits)
Holland
Discrimination, Special Programs
Coleman
Discrimination, Reasonable Accommodation
Manley, Thomas
Employability
Buchanan, Cook, Firth, Martin, Polkabla, Truss
Employment Discrimination
Commonwealth Department of Labor
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Ryans, Swan
Financial Eligibility/Financial Needs Testing
Fogel, Jongquist, Mosholder, Smith, Stephens
Individualized Services
Scott
Interpreter Services
Firth, Jones, Schornstein
IWRP
Feretti, Murphy, Tourville, Wenger
Maintenance
Turbedsky, Scott
Berg, Brewer, Buchanan, Chirico, Firth, Mallet, Murphy, Polkabla, Romano, Stevenson, Truss, Tourville,
Post-Secondary Services
Berg, Buchannan, Cook, Firth, McGuire, Murphy, Polkabla, Truss, Tourville
Post-Employment Services
Chirico
Private Right of Action
Cousins, Johnson-Lloyd, Jones, Marshall, Ryans
Reasonable Accommodation
Manley, Thomas
Rulemaking
Spear, Stephens
Section 1983
Johnson-Lloyd, Marshall, Ryans, Swan
Severity of Disability
Martin, McGuire
Similar Benefits (see also Comparable Services and Benefits)
Schornstein
Standard of Review
Beason, Fuller
Termination of Services
Beason, Feretti, Swan
Transportation/Vehicle Modifications
Marshall, Stephens
Tuition
Fogel, McGuire, Murphy, Mosholder, Truss, Tourville
Written Policies
Jongquist, Mosholder
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